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INTRODUCTION
In the past few years, different governing entities have labored to reform
patent litigation. The 114th Congress has introduced eight reform bills.1 The
Patent and Trademark Office (“PTO”) has launched a website to help
consumers understand patent litigation and sought public input on improving
the clarity of software patents.2 The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) has
investigated companies that have sent vague demand letters in which they
request royalties for patent use and threaten lawsuit initiation if the royalties
are not paid.3 State legislatures have also enacted or introduced bills to curb
these vague demand letters.4 The Supreme Court has attempted to discourage
vague and frivolous claims by lowering standards for awarding attorney’s
fees in patent cases and for invalidating patents.5
In the midst of these reform efforts, one player in patent litigation has
stood out: the patent troll—an entity that does not practice its patents but
seeks to monetize them through royalty demands and lawsuit initiations.6
Many commentators argue that the term “patent trolls” should not include
inventors and universities because the latter patentees are valuable sources
of innovation.7 Such patentees are also not very litigious, in contrast to trolls
1. Trade Protection, Not Troll Protection Act, H.R. 4829, 114th Cong. (2016); Venue Equity and
Non-Uniformity Elimination Act of 2016, S. 2733, 114th Cong. (2016); Targeting Rogue and Opaque
Letters Act of 2015, H.R. 2045, 114th Cong. (2015); Demand Letter Transparency Act of 2015,
H.R. 1896, 114th Cong. (2015); Innovation Project Act, H.R. 1832, 114th Cong. (2015); PATENT Act,
S. 1137, 114th Cong. (2015); STRONG Patents Act of 2015, S. 632, 114th Cong. (2015); Innovation
Protection Act, H.R. 9, 114th Cong. (2015).
2. Andrew S. Baluch, Patent Reform 2015: A Comprehensive Guide to Current Patent Reform
Developments in Congress, the Executive Branch, the Courts, and the States, SOCIAL SCIENCE RESEARCH
NETWORK, Jan. 23, 2015, at 36–37.
3. Id. at 33–34.
4. See id. at 42 (“More than half the 50 states have enacted or introduced a law in their state
legislatures to . . . make [it] illegal to send ‘bad faith’ patent demand letters to residents of those states.”).
5. See Octane Fitness, LLC v. ICON Health & Fitness, Inc., 134 S. Ct. 1749, 1756 (2014) (lowering
the standard for awarding attorney’s fees in patent litigation); Nautilus, Inc. v. Biosig Instruments, Inc.,
134 S. Ct. 2120, 2129 (2014) (raising the notice standard so that a patent can more easily be invalidated).
6. See Mark A. Lemley & A. Douglas Melamed, Missing the Forest for the Trolls, 113 COLUM. L.
REV. 2117, 2118 (2013) (“Patent trolls [are] patent owners whose primary business is collecting money
from others that allegedly infringe their patents . . . .”); James F. McDonough III, Comment, The Myth of
the Patent Troll: An Alternative View of the Function of Patent Dealers in an Idea Economy, 56 EMORY
L.J. 189, 189 (2006) (“A patent troll is a person or entity who acquires ownership of a patent without the
intention of actually using it to produce a product.”); Sannu K. Shrestha, Note, Trolls or Market-Makers?
An Empirical Analysis of Nonpracticing Entities, 110 COLUM. L. REV. 114, 115 (2010) (“[Patent trolls]
are firms that rarely or never practice their patents, instead focusing on earning licensing fees.”).
7. See Christopher A. Cotropia et al., Unpacking Patent Assertion Entities (PAEs), 99 MINN. L.
REV. 649, 656–57 (2014) (suggesting that universities and original inventors should not be labeled as
patent trolls); Mark A. Lemley, Are Universities Patent Trolls?, 18 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA &
ENT. L.J. 611, 612 (2008) (arguing that “universities, although nonpracticing patent owners, are not
necessarily patent trolls”); Eric Rogers & Young Jeon, Inhibiting Patent Trolling: A New Approach for
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whose primary activity is patent enforcement.8 Thus, in this paper, the term
“patent trolls” does not include inventors and universities but incorporates
only entities that buy patents from others.
In 2012, trolls initiated sixty-two percent of all patent lawsuits.9 They
filed 448 cases in 2010; that number increased to 2,278 in 2012.10 Many
commentators blame trolls for the problems associated with patent
enforcement including weak and vague legal claims, high litigation costs,
impenetrable patent portfolios, and inconvenient timing of assertions.11
Accordingly, many have publicly denounced trolls. For example, in 2006, in
his concurring opinion in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., Justice
Kennedy accused trolls of using the threat of injunctive relief to coerce
potential licensees into paying exorbitant fees.12 In 2014, President Obama
condemned trolls for not offering actual goods or services and for extorting
money from other companies.13 Other commentators have attacked trolls as
“unsavory characters,”14 “parasites on successful businesses,”15 and “mold
that eventually grows on rotten meat.”16 Only a handful of commentators are
troll advocates. For the most part, advocates have highlighted the value of

Applying Rule 11, 12 NW. J. TECH. & INTELL. PROP. 291, 303 (2014) (arguing that universities and
inventors should not be considered patent trolls); David L. Schwartz & Jay P. Kesan, Essay, Analyzing
the Role of Non-Practicing Entities in the Patent System, 99 CORNELL L. REV. 425, 429–30 (2014)
(explaining that many commentators do not view individual inventors and universities as patent trolls).
8. See Michael Risch, Patent Troll Myths, 42 SETON HALL L. REV. 457, 488–89 (2012)
(“[U]niversities are rarely patent plaintiffs . . . . [S]olo-inventor and university plaintiffs have fewer (or
even single) patents, limiting their choices about which patents to pursue.”).
9. Colleen Chien, Patent Trolls by the Numbers 1 (Santa Clara Univ. Sch. of Law, Legal Studies
Research Paper No. 08-13, Mar. 13, 2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2233041.
10. See Cotropia et al., supra note 7, at 674 fig.1 (adding up the numbers for the large aggregator
and patent holding company categories); see also Daniel P. McCurdy, Patent Trolls Erode the Foundation
of the U.S. Patent System, PATENT REFORM, Fall/Winter 2008–2009, at 78, 79 (“Over the past year—
from October 1, 2007 through September 30, 2008—389 litigations were filed involving the
PatentFreedom-tracked [non-practicing entities], compared with 297 in the prior year.”).
11. See infra Part I.
12. eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 396 (2006).
13. Ali Sternburg, Obama Calls For Patent Reform in the State of the Union, PATENT PROGRESS
(Jan. 29, 2014), http://www.patentprogress.org/2014/01/29/obamas-state-union-executive-actions-callpatent-reform/; see also Edward Wyatt, Obama Orders Regulators to Root Out “Patent Trolls,” N.Y.
TIMES (June 4, 2013), http://www.nytimes.com/2013/06/05/business/president-moves-to-curb-patentsuits.html (“[T]he Obama administration is cracking down on what many call patent trolls . . . .”).
14. Steven Pearlstein, Big Firms Caught with Their Patents Down, WASH. POST (Dec. 2, 2005),
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2005/12/01/AR2005120101509.html.
15. William M. Bulkeley, Aggressive Patent Litigants Pose Growing Threat to Big Business, WALL.
ST. J. (Sept. 14, 2005), http://www.wsj.com/articles/SB112666647063840131.
16. Tim Wu, Weapons of Business Destruction, SLATE (Feb. 6, 2006, 3:04 P.M.),
http://www.slate.com/articles/news_and_politics/jurisprudence/2006/02/weapons_of_business_destructi
on.html.
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these entities in providing capital to inventors.17 However, they have shied
away from addressing trolls’ role in patent enforcement.
This paper is the first to tackle headfirst the role of patent trolls in
litigation. Part I argues that trolls are either not the sole source of problems
associated with patent assertions or not responsible for these problems in the
first place. Part II explains that these entities provide the same litigationrelated benefits as commercial litigation funders, which, like trolls, supply
capital for patent lawsuits. Both entities are engaging in “trolldom,” which
the Seventh Circuit recently defined as “the seeking of financial advantage
by buying or otherwise obtaining a legal claim (as distinct from filing a legal
claim in order to seek redress for injury).”18
Commercial litigation financiers are entities other than litigants,
attorneys, and insurers.19 They invest in large-stakes lawsuits, such as patent
and antitrust cases, by offering plaintiffs capital in exchange for a portion of
case proceeds.20 Thus, financiers receive no returns from unsuccessful
litigation. Patent lawsuits make up approximately twenty to thirty percent of
general funders’ portfolios.21 For example, as of June 30, 2015, $28.5 million
out of $142.2 million (or twenty percent of) Juridica’s investments were in
cases involving patents and intellectual property.22 Some financiers, such as
Altitude Capital Partners, specialize in funding patent lawsuits.23
Both commercial litigation funders and patent trolls offer capital for
lawsuits, mitigate risk differences between litigants, and provide valuable

17. See, e.g., Nathan Myhrvold, Funding Eureka!, HARV. BUS. REV., March 2010, at 1, 1–4
(explaining how Intellectual Ventures, a patent troll, fosters a market of capital for inventors and the
benefits of such a capital market for innovation).
18. Carhart v. Carhart-Halaska Int’l, LLC, 788 F.3d 687, 691 (7th Cir. 2015).
19. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N ON ETHICS 20/20, WHITE PAPER ON ALTERNATIVE
LITIGATION
FINANCE
1
(2011),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/ethics_2020/20111212_ethics_
20_20_alf_white_paper_final_hod_informational_report.authcheckdam.pdf (“Alternative litigation
finance (‘ALF’) refers to the funding of litigation activities by entities other than the parties themselves,
their counsel, or other entities with a preexisting contractual relationship with one of the parties, such as
an indemnitor or a liability insurer.”).
20. GARBER, RAND CORP., ALTERNATIVE LITIGATION FINANCING IN THE UNITED STATES: ISSUES,
KNOWNS,
AND
UNKNOWNS
13
(2010),
http://www.rand.org/content/dam/rand/pubs/occasional_papers/2010/RAND_OP306.pdf; Jonathan T.
Molot, Litigation Finance: A Market Solution to a Procedural Problem, 99 GEO. L.J. 65, 96 (2010).
21. See Joanna M. Shepherd, Ideal Versus Reality in Third-Party Litigation Financing, 8 J.L. ECON.
& POL’Y 593, 601 (2012) (noting that in May 2011, Juridica had 28 percent of its investments in patent
infringement
cases);
The
Fund,
JURIDICA
INVESTMENTS
LTD.,
http://www.juridicainvestments.com/about-juridica/the-fund.aspx (last visited June 30, 2015) (showing
that 20 percent of the company’s investments were in patent cases).
22. JURIDICA INVESTMENTS LTD., supra note 21.
23. Firm Overview, ALTITUDE CAPITAL PARTNERS (2009), http://www.altitudecp.com/firm.html.
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expertise as repeat players.24 Because of these benefits, funding
commentators have portrayed financiers as saviors of cash-strapped, risk
averse plaintiffs: “litigation funding serves a real need”;25 “[b]y enlisting the
help and cash of a third party, the plaintiff may be able to bolster its
negotiating position vis-à-vis the defendant”;26 and “[f]or small and midsize
plaintiffs, [financing] can mean the difference between thriving, surviving[,]
or even going bust.”27 While funding is not exempt from disapproval and
“unflattering metaphors,”28 even skeptics and those that question this
business practice recognize its benefits to plaintiffs.29 In contrast, troll
commentators have ignored the aforementioned litigation-related benefits
and have largely criticized trolls for their role in patent enforcement.
Hopefully, by demonstrating that these entities provide the same benefits as
funders in Part II, future commentators will take into consideration these
positive contributions and more accurately assess the troll business practice.
Finally, Part III shows that targeting trolls in policymaking is not the
panacea to curing patent litigation’s ills. A decrease in these entities will only
lead to an increase in trolling behavior by practicing entities and a rise in
litigation funding investment.30 The first effect is undesirable because unlike
trolls, practicing entities seek out their competitors in patent enforcement and
have a higher likelihood of reducing market producers than non-practicing
entities, due to a greater ability to obtain injunctions.31 The second effect is
undesirable because legal financing implicates three issues that are avoided
by the troll business model: (1) decision-maker conflicts of interest, (2)
waivers of attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protection,
and (3) the undue influence of funding on the attorney.32

24. See infra Part II.A.
25. Robert W. Wood, Litigation Funding Lures Investors, Plaintiffs & Lawyers, FORBES (Feb. 20,
2014), http://www.forbes.com/sites/robertwood/2014/02/20/lawsuit-funding-lures-investors-plaintiffslawyers/.
26. Molot, supra note 20, at 97.
27. Judith Messina, Litigation-Finance Firms Bet On the Little Guy, CRAIN’S N.Y. BUSINESS (Feb.
10, 2015), http://www.crainsnewyork.com/article/20150210/SMALLBIZ/302089990/litigation-financefirms-bet-on-the-little-guy.
28. See W. Bradley Wendel, Litigation Trolls, 12 N.Y.U. J.L. & BUS. 725, 726 (2016) (“Litigation
financers have been likened to gamblers in the courtroom casino, loan sharks, vultures, Wild West
outlaws, and busybodies mucking about in the private affairs of others.” (citations omitted)).
29. See, e.g., Roger Parloff, Have You Got a Piece of This Lawsuit?, FORTUNE (June 28, 2011),
http://fortune.com/2011/06/28/have-you-got-a-piece-of-this-lawsuit-2/ (recognizing the benefits of
funding while discussing the “troubling new business”).
30. See infra Part III.
31. See infra Section III.A.
32. See infra Section III.B.
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I. CONFRONTING CRITICS’ LITIGATION-RELATED COMPLAINTS AGAINST
TROLLS
Many commentators blame trolls for problems that plague patent
litigation: weak and vague legal claims, high litigation costs, impenetrable
patent portfolios, and inconvenient timing of assertions.33 This Part defends
trolls against these lawsuit-related complaints. Opponents of trolls often
make allegations without considering empirical evidence or countervailing
incentives. Further, they often fail to recognize that the problems associated
with patent litigation are not unique to trolls.
A. Weak and Vague Patents
First, opponents complain that trolls bring cases premised on weak and
vague patents.34 It is unknown to what degree trolls are vindicating patents
of a lower quality than those of other plaintiffs. Empirical evidence suggests
that at least some troll litigation is based on patents that are comparable to
the ones enforced by practicing entities. Using common measures of patent
quality including the number of citations by other patents and the number of
legal claims in the patent document, Allison et al. (2009), Shrestha (2010),
and Risch (2012) concluded that non-practicing entities, which include
trolls,35 hold patents that are at least as valuable as those held by practicing
entities.36 Measuring patent quality by litigation success (e.g., the percentage
of cases won at trial), Shrestha (2010) and Risch (2012) discovered that nonpracticing entities are just as successful as practicing entities.37
Allison et al. (2011) and Mazzeo et al. (2013) found the opposite result, but
Mazzeo and his coauthors showed that the lower success rate of nonpracticing entities is driven by universities and individual inventors, not
33. See, e.g., Spencer Hosie, Patent Trolls and the New Tort Reform: A Practitioner’s Perspective,
4 I/S: J.L. & POL’Y FOR INFO. SOC’Y 75, 78 (2008) (“Perhaps the most common refrain in the patent
debate is that plaintiffs will bring frivolous cases to extort unjustified settlements.”); Lemley & Melamed,
supra note 6, at 2117 (“Patent trolls are increasingly blamed for the growing costs of patent litigation and
seemingly excessive damages awards and patent royalties.”); Jason Kirby, Patent Troll or Producer?,
FIN. POST (Jan. 14, 2006), http://www.financialpost.com/story.html?id=1509d361-0144-4432-b6dc2c14026c98d6 (“Critics argue that patent trolls, or patent holders who threaten companies with costly
court battles unless they’re offered licensing fees, are a serious threat to legitimate businesses.”).
34. See, e.g., Shrestha, supra note 6, at 119 (“One of the most prominent criticisms against [patent
trolls] is that they acquire weak and obscure patents and use them to pursue ‘baseless’ litigation.”).
35. Non-practicing entities are entities that do not practice their patents and can include independent
inventors, universities, and patent trolls.
36. John R. Allison et al., Extreme Value or Trolls on Top?: The Characteristics of the MostLitigated Patents, 158 U. PA. L. REV. 1, 28–29 (2009); Risch, supra note 8, at 480; Shrestha, supra note
6, at 118.
37. Risch, supra note 8, at 481–82; Shrestha, supra note 6, at 157–58 tbl.4 & 5.
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trolls.38 In sum, these studies suggest that the legal claims of trolls are of a
similar quality to those of practicing entities.
Even if the weak-and-vague patent issue is unique to trolls, these
entities are not the creators of the legal claims and therefore should not be
blamed for their quality. Inventors are the ones who craft the claims in the
patent document.39 The PTO is the agency that has the authority to approve
the document.40 Just as the creators of a contract control its wording, those
who fashion the patent—inventors who write the application and the PTO
that validates it—dictate its wording. Inventors and the PTO, not trolls, are
responsible for the quality of patent claims.41
B. High Litigation Costs
Second, critics gripe about the costs of troll lawsuits.42 Bessen and
Meurer (2014) estimated the sum of direct costs on defendants of nonpracticing entity (including troll) litigation to be approximately twenty-nine
billion dollars.43 Beyond direct lawsuit expenses, opponents argue that troll
patent assertions also impose indirect costs, such as the disruption of
business operations and loss of market share.44 When examining the time
period from January 2007 to October 2011, Bessen et al. (2011) found that
defendants’ total loss of wealth resulting from non-practicing entity litigation
was eighty-three billion dollars per year.45

38. John R. Allison et al., Patent Quality and Settlement Among Repeat Patent Litigants, 99 GEO.
L.J. 677, 693 fig.4 (2011); Michael J. Mazzeo et al., Do NPEs Matter? Non-Practicing Entities and Patent
Litigation Outcomes, 9 J. COMP. LAW & ECON. 879, 889–901 (2013).
39. See CRAIG ALLEN NARD, THE LAW OF PATENTS 39–51 (3d ed. 2014) (explaining the process of
applying for and obtaining a patent).
40. See id. (explaining the patent application process); see also Mark A. Lemley & Bhaven Sampat,
Is the Patent Office a Rubber Stamp?, 58 EMORY L.J. 181, 187–202 (2008) (providing empirical evidence
that the patent office is quite active in dealing with applications and not just a rubber stamp of approval).
41. See McDonough, supra note 6, at 202 (explaining that patent quality issues should be attributed
to an understaffed patent office).
42. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2161 (“[T]he idea that dealing with troll patents
is more costly than dealing with practicing entities seems to resonate with those facing troll suits.”).
43. James Bessen & Michael J. Meurer, The Direct Costs from NPE Disputes, 99 CORNELL L. REV.
387, 389 (2014).
44. Id. at 390 (“Indirect costs . . . include . . . business disruption costs such as loss of goodwill, loss
of market share, and disruption of innovative activities.”); Marc Morgan, Stop Looking Under the Bridge
for Imaginary Creatures: A Comment Examining Who Really Deserves the Title Patent Troll, 17 FED.
CIR. B.J. 165, 169 (2008) (“The patent enforcement activities of [patent trolls] may prevent some products
from reaching consumers because vendors face large costs just to research patent infringement claims.”).
45. James Bessen et al., The Private and Social Costs of Patent Trolls, 34 REGULATION 26, 31
(2011).
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While patent cases financially burden defendants, they also necessitate
large capital investments from plaintiffs including trolls—a point that critics
have failed to recognize.46 For a median-value patent lawsuit between one
and twenty-five million dollars, a plaintiff pays about two million dollars in
litigation costs.47 Unless a troll believes that the expected value of the case
exceeds the expenses, it will not initiate the legal action.48 Further, there is
no empirical evidence that suggests troll litigation imposes higher costs on
defendants than that of practicing entities. In fact, patent assertions by
practicing entities are likely more burdensome for defendants due to the
discovery needed to investigate these entities’ products or services.49
C. Impenetrable Patent Portfolios
Third, critics complain about trolls building large patent portfolios and
then asserting them against practicing entities.50 A defendant facing a broad
array of patents in a lawsuit often settles because at least one of them is
probably valid; it may be less costly to pay for a license that covers the entire
array than to continue with litigation.51 Additionally, because a portfolio
frequently contains alternative technologies, defendants find it difficult to
negotiate the royalties down by threatening to license a substitute from
another patentee.52
Although trolls do collect patents, this practice is not unique to them. 53
Practicing entities accumulate patents related to their business activities, as
well as buy unrelated ones like trolls do.54 For example, smartphone
companies are practicing entities that are well known for their collections.55

46. Shrestha, supra note 6, at 120.
47. Id.
48. See STEVEN SHAVELL, FOUNDATIONS OF ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 390 (2004) (“The
plaintiff will sue when his cost of suit is less than his expected benefits from suit.”).
49. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2162–63.
50. See id. at 2153 (“A common complaint about trolls . . . is that they aggregate large numbers of
patents and that the aggregation of large numbers of patents in the hands of a single entity overwhelms
alleged infringers by giving them little choice but to pay for a license for the bundle of patents . . . .”).
Note that potential defendants are all practicing entities, since only practicing entities provide
products or services that may infringe patents.
51. See id. at 2127 (“[T]he patent aggregator has so many patents that read on a particular target
that a challenge to the validity of the patents makes little sense.”).
52. Id. at 2153.
53. See id. (“[T]here is no reason to think that aggregations by trolls are more likely to give rise to
these problems than aggregations by practicing entities.”).
54. Id. at 2155.
55. Id.
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In 2011, Google purchased the right to Motorola Mobility’s 17,000 patents.56
Also, in 2011, a group of companies including Apple, Ericsson, Microsoft,
RIM, and Sony bought 6,000 Nortel Networks’ telecommunications
patents.57 Thus, trolls are not the sole source of impenetrable patent
portfolios.
D. Inconvenient Timing of Patent Assertions
Finally, opponents accuse trolls of waiting for companies to invest in
technologies covered by trolls’ patents so that these businesses will face
switching costs if they choose not to license these technologies later on.58
Critics also argue that trolls have a lower incentive than practicing entities to
show off their patents.59 Practicing entities attempt to deter potential
plaintiffs by highlighting their portfolios to signal the possibility of
counterclaims; that is, these entities will assert their own patents in response
to the initiation of a lawsuit.60 In contrast, trolls need not worry about others
suing them because they do not offer products or services that could encroach
on others’ patents.61
While the switching costs of technology investment may motivate trolls
to hide their patents, countervailing incentives exist to encourage them to
bring cases in a prompt manner. First, trolls must file suit before the patent
expiration date, which is twenty years after the application date.62 Second, in
patent litigation, the defendant can raise the defense of laches if “the plaintiff
delayed filing suit an unreasonable and inexcusable length of time after the
plaintiff knew or reasonably should have known of its claim against the
56. Thomas H. Chia, Note, Fighting the Smartphone Patent War with RAND-Encumbered Patents,
27 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 209, 209 (2012); Yongwook Paik & Feng Zhu, The Impact of Patent Wars on
Firm Strategy: Evidence from the Global Smartphone Market 11 (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper 14015,
2013),
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/14-015_82697dd2-5915-45fd-8973d2751a87f9ef.pdf.
57. Chris V. Nicholson, Apple and Microsoft Beat Google for Nortel Patents, N.Y. TIMES (July 1,
2011),
http://dealbook.nytimes.com/2011/07/01/apple-and-microsoft-beat-google-for-nortelpatents/?_r=0; Paik & Zhu, supra note 56, at 11.
58. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2165; Shrestha, supra note 6, at 122; see Gerard N.
Magliocca, Blackberries and Barnyards: Patent Trolls and the Perils of Innovation, 82 NOTRE DAME L.
REV. 1809, 1814–17 (2007) (explaining the problem of trolls enforcing dormant patents).
59. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2164–65; McCurdy, supra note 10, at 82.
60. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2164 (“[P]racticing entities often like to draw attention
to their large patent holdings in order to deter assertions against them by other practicing entities . . . .”).
61. See Magliocca, supra note 58, at 1817 (“But trolls are immune from this constraint because they
are the quintessential one-shot players who are not interested in cooperative pooling arrangements.”).
62. 35 U.S.C. § 154; see Brief of Various Law & Economics Professors as Amici Curiae Supporting
Respondent at 20, eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388 (2006) (No. 05-130) [hereinafter Law
& Econ. Professors’ Brief] (“All patents are wasting assets, with less than a 20 year life . . . .”).
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defendant; and . . . the delay resulted in material prejudice or injury to the
defendant.”63 The defendant’s switching costs may constitute an economic
prejudice or injury.64
Not only does a troll have reasons to quickly bring its claims but it is
also not the sole party that affects the timing of technology development and
litigation. Companies that invest in technology and original inventors also
contribute to patents being enforced after switching costs have materialized.
First, companies can conduct a patent check before investing in the usage
and advancement of technologies; ex ante due diligence can mitigate
enforcement surprises later.65 Second, trolls buy from inventors who cannot
afford to enforce their own patents.66 Thus, patents may have been dormant
due to previous owners’ economic inability to bring lawsuits, not strategic
action on the part of trolls.67
II. TROLLS OFFER LITIGATION-RELATED BENEFITS
Part I defended trolls against four litigation-related criticisms by
recognizing empirical evidence, countervailing incentives, and the nonexclusive nature of patent litigation ills (i.e., these ills are not confined to
trolls). Not only should commentators refrain from accusing trolls of causing

63. Wanlass v. General Elec. Co., 148 F.3d 1334, 1337 (Fed. Cir. 1998) (quoting Gasser Chair Co.,
Inc. v. Infanti Chair Mfg. Corp., 60 F.3d 770, 773 (Fed. Cir. 1995)); see Law & Econ. Professors’ Brief,
supra note 62, at 20 (“All patents are . . . subject to the defenses based on laches and estoppel.”).
64. Wanlass, 148 F.3d at 1337 (“Economic prejudice may arise where a defendant and possibly
others will suffer the loss of monetary investments or incur damages which likely would have been
prevented by earlier suit.” (citation omitted)); see also In re Bogese, 303 F.3d 1362, 1366 (Fed. Cir. 2002)
(suggesting that prosecution laches may apply to dismiss a patentee’s application “when the industry has
developed and matured to such a point as to be more financially beneficial to the applicant and hence
more harmful or prejudicial to the public [and the industry]”).
65. See Shrestha, supra note 6, at 123 (“The problem . . . could be avoided if the manufacturer
conducted a ‘patent clearance’ before sinking substantial resources into developing and marketing a
product.”); Gene Quinn, Difference Between Patent Searches & Infringement Clearance, IP WATCHDOG
(Jan.
21,
2010),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2010/01/21/difference-between-patent-searchesinfringement-clearance/id=8521/ (explaining what a patent clearance search is).
66. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 428 (“[Patent trolls] purchase patents from these
patentees who cannot afford to enforce their own patents.”).
67. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE EVOLVING IP MARKETPLACE: ALIGNING PATENT NOTICE AND
REMEDIES
WITH
COMPETITION
68
(2011),
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/reports/evolving-ip-marketplace-aligning-patentnotice-and-remedies-competition-report-federal-trade/110307patentreport.pdf (“[I]ndependent inventors
have great difficulty negotiating royalty payments from large operating companies because they cannot
credibly threaten expensive infringement suits.”); McDonough, supra note 6, at 210 (“Individual
inventors and small entities rarely have the financial resources to commence and sustain a lawsuit.”); see
also Robert P. Merges & Jeffery M. Kuhn, An Estoppel Doctrine for Patented Standards, 97 CALIF. L.
REV. 1, 35 (2009) (explaining that inventors cannot evade laches by assigning their patents to another
entity).
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problems for which these entities are not responsible or that are not unique
to them, but they should also recognize trolls for their positive contributions.
The oft-cited benefit of these entities is provision of capital to
inventors.68 An innovator does not receive a financial reward for obtaining a
patent.69 In fact, applying for one is costly and time-consuming. Patent
approval takes approximately 25.3 months on average,70 and attorney’s fees
related to filing an application for an “extremely simple” invention are
approximately five to seven thousand dollars.71 In order to profit from a
patent, the innovator has to commercialize, license, and/or sell the
invention.72 Entities of all types—solo inventors, universities, nonprofit
research organizations, distressed or bankrupt companies, startups, and
Fortune 500 companies—have taken advantage of the option of selling their
patents to trolls.73 Once they pass off their patents, they can shift their focus
from litigation to other business activities.74 These companies may use
proceeds from the sale to commercialize inventions, develop new products
and services, or launch advertising campaigns.75

68. See, e.g., Myhrvold, supra note 17, at 1–4 (explaining how a patent troll contributes capital to
inventors).
69. See id. at 1 (“[I]nventions are too intangible to generate sufficient profits by themselves.”);
McDonough, supra note 6, at 208 (“[O]nce the patent is granted, the inventor . . . has yet to realize the
economic benefit.”); Shrestha, supra note 6, at 126 (“An independent inventor does not realize any
financial gains simply by obtaining a patent.”).
70. Data Visualization Center, U.S. PATENT AND TRADEMARK OFFICE (Sept. 2016),
https://www.uspto.gov/dashboards/patents/main.dashxml.
71. Gene Quinn, The Cost of Obtaining a Patent in the US, IP WATCHDOG (Apr. 4, 2015),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2015/04/04/the-cost-of-obtaining-a-patent-in-the-us/id=56485/.
72. See Shrestha, supra note 6, at 126–27 (“An independent inventor does not realize any financial
gains simply by obtaining a patent. She has to either develop a product and commercialize it or license
the patent to a third party.).
73. See, e.g., Magliocca, supra note 58, at 1817 (“[P]atents come[] from distressed start-ups that
either go bankrupt trying to bring their inventions to market or sell their portfolio for pennies on the dollar
because they do not have any other assets.”); Myhrvold, supra note 17, at 8 (listing the types of inventors
that Intellectual Ventures, a patent troll, has purchased patents from); Risch, supra note 8, at 488–89
(explaining that a “large portion” of the patents held by the non-practicing entities in the sample were
held by individuals and a small percentage was from companies that were “demonstrably defunct”).
74. See, e.g., FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 68 (explaining how patent sellers can use sale
proceeds for other business activities).
75. Id. (“Both large and small companies are better able to find buyers for patent portfolios that they
no longer need or wish to maintain. Selling those portfolios allows companies to recoup some return on
the associated R&D investment and raise funds that can be used to support other innovative efforts.”);
Magliocca, supra note 58, at 1818 (“[T]rolls invest in undercapitalized firms and thereby make a
significant contribution to research and development.”); Shrestha, supra note 6, at 127 (“[Patent trolls]
encourage [independent inventors] to engage in further inventive activity.”).
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Both opponents and supporters of trolls have recognized the positive
effects of providing capital to inventors,76 but neither group has
acknowledged the litigation-related benefits that trolls offer. In this Part, I
expressly define these benefits by looking to commercial litigation funders,
which participate in the same market as trolls. In March 2011, the FTC,
which is the agency responsible for enforcing antitrust laws and is therefore
known for its expertise in evaluating and defining markets, issued a report
titled “The Evolving IP Marketplace.”77 The agency placed commercial
litigation funders in the ex post patent transaction and litigation market along
with trolls such as patent enforcement and licensing companies.78
Below, Section II.A explains that trolls provide the same three
litigation-related benefits as funders: making available capital for lawsuits,
mitigating risk differences, and offering repeat-player expertise. Section II.B
rebuts arguments that despite being in the same market, trolls are
fundamentally different from and worse than funders because the former buy
the right to bring the patent claim and are thus entitled to one hundred percent
of the lawsuit proceeds.
A. Litigation-Related Benefits
Funders and trolls offer the same litigation-related benefits: providing
resources for patent cases, bearing lawsuit risk, and serving as a repeat player

76. See, e.g., Bessen & Meurer, supra note 43, at 409 (acknowledging provision of capital to
inventors as a benefit of non-practicing entities); Myhrvold, supra note 17, at 1–4 (explaining how a
patent troll contributes capital to inventors).
77. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 1; A Brief Overview of the Federal Trade Commission’s
Investigative and Law Enforcement Authority, FED. TRADE COMM’N (July 2008),
https://www.ftc.gov/about-ftc/what-we-do/enforcement-authority.
78. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 62–65. The FTC used the general term “litigation
finance firms,” instead of “commercial litigation funders.” However, the agency’s description of these
funders as “firms [that] raise money from institutional investors and other resources to support the patent
enforcement efforts of small companies and independent inventors” clearly refers to commercial litigation
funders.
There are three segments of the litigation finance industry: companies that finance individual
plaintiffs of personal injury lawsuits (consumer litigation funding), businesses that fund plaintiffs’ law
firms (law firm funding), and entities that finance plaintiffs involved in commercial litigation such as
patent or antitrust lawsuits (commercial litigation funding). GARBER, supra note 20, at 8–9.
For more information about consumer litigation funding, see Nicholas Beydler, Comment, Risky
Business: Examining Approaches to Regulating Consumer Litigation Funding, 80 UMKC L. REV. 1159,
1163 (2012); Martin J. Estevao, Comment, The Litigation Financing Industry: Regulation to Protect and
Inform Consumers, 84 U. COLO. L. REV. 467, 474 (2013); and Jean Xiao, Note, Heuristics, Biases, and
Consumer Litigation Funding at the Bargaining Table, 68 VAND. L. REV. 262, 265 (2015).
For more information about law firm funding, see GARBER, supra note 20, at 13; Molot, supra
note
20,
at
98;
and
Attorney
Funding,
EXCALIBUR
FUNDING
PROGRAMS,
http://www.excaliburlegal.com/AttorneyPricing.html (last visited Oct. 18, 2015).
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in the litigation game. First, both offer resources for initiating or sustaining
patent assertions. Launching a lawsuit requires a substantial upfront capital
investment to obtain a settlement or judgment in the remote future.79 Since
commencing a legal action may lower stock prices or decrease consumer
demand, businesses find it hard to justify such a large expenditure.80 Making
such an expenditure means forgoing the development of new products, the
employment of better workers, or the pursuit of other profitable ventures.81
Both funders and trolls provide alternatives to businesses making the lawsuit
investment out of pocket.82 Companies can use what they obtain from
funders for litigation expenses, such as hiring top-notch attorneys.83
Businesses can also sell their patents to trolls, which then enforce them.84
Often, small companies do not have the necessary financial assets to pose a
credible litigation threat against potential infringers, whereas trolls have
substantial resources to expend on patent assertions.85
79. Joanna M. Shepherd & Judd E. Stone II, Economic Conundrums in Search of a Solution: The
Functions of Third-Party Litigation Finance, 47 ARIZ. ST. L.J. 919, 927 (2015).
80. See id. (“Companies with outside investors are also hesitant to incur voluntary expenses with
uncertain prospective payoffs because they must justify these expenses both directly to investors and
through publicly available reports and metrics. Even a comparatively small additional expense may be
received unfavorably in market reports, mandatory corporate disclosures, or in share prices.”).
81. See Shepherd & Stone, supra note 79, at 927 (“Most companies with sufficient business
ventures to engender valuable business litigation have lucrative substitutes for the capital required to
prosecute a complex commercial case, including developing new product lines, recruiting scarce or
expensive talent, or expanding current manufacturing or distribution channels.”); see also FED. TRADE
COMM’N, supra note 67, at 68 (“Both large and small companies are better able to find buyers for patent
portfolios that they no longer need or wish to maintain. Selling those portfolios allows companies to
recoup some return on the associated R&D investment and raise funds that can be used to support other
innovative efforts.”).
82. See Mattathias Schwartz, Should You Be Allowed to Invest in a Lawsuit?, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 22,
2015),
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/10/25/magazine/should-you-be-allowed-to-invest-in-alawsuit.html?_r=0 (“Larger companies, even those with their own in-house counsel, are selling off pieces
of lawsuits to smooth out cash flow and offload risk.”).
83. See Jonathan T. Molot, The Feasibility of Litigation Markets, 89 INDIANA L.J. 171, 179 (2014)
(“[F]inancing can provide a business claimant with the resources it needs to retain topflight
counsel . . . .”); Shepherd & Stone, supra note 79, at 946 (“Litigation financiers provide the initial or
ongoing investment necessary to operate a lawsuit, obviating the need for the business firm to divert
capital from business lines.”).
84. See, e.g., Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 428 (“[Patent trolls] purchase patents from these
patentees who cannot afford to enforce their own patents. [Trolls] accept the risks and uncertainty
associated with attempting to enforce the patent rights.”).
85. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 68 (“[I]ndependent inventors have great difficulty
negotiating royalty payments from large operating companies because they cannot credibly threaten
expensive infringement suits.”); Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 428 (“[Patent trolls] purchase patents
from these patentees who cannot afford to enforce their own patents.”); McDonough, supra note 6, at 210
(“Individual inventors and small entities rarely have the financial resources to commence and sustain a
lawsuit.”); Shrestha, supra note 6, at 127 (“Even if the inventor were to try to license her patent on her
own, she would be unlikely to obtain a licensing fee that [a patent troll] could obtain during negotiations
because the latter brings a key ingredient to the bargaining table: a credible litigation threat.”); Stephen
H. Haber & Seth H. Werfel, Why Do Inventors Sell to Patent Trolls? Experimental Evidence for the
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Second, funders and trolls both bear lawsuit risk. Businesses, as
plaintiffs, are typically risk averse when facing litigation.86 This is
problematic when defendants are risk neutral.87 A difference in risk levels
can lead to a settlement that deviates from the expected value of the case.88
Risk aversion can cause plaintiffs to consent to lower settlements in order to
evade the uncertainties associated with trials.89 When skewed settlements
systematically occur, the goals of the legal system, including optimal
compensation and deterrence, are not met.90 A plaintiff may seek funding in
order to shift litigation risk from itself to the funder. 91 The financier can
better manage the risk because it maintains a portfolio of lawsuits and can
spread the risk of one case over the others.92 After receiving funding, the
plaintiff is closer to risk neutrality and can obtain a settlement with a smaller
deviation from the expected lawsuit value.93 Alternatively, unwillingness to

Asymmetry Hypothesis, ECON. LETTERS (forthcoming) (finding experimental evidence for the hypothesis
that “an asymmetry in financial resources between individual patent holders and manufacturers prevents
individuals from making a credible threat to litigate against infringement”).
86. See Shepherd & Stone, supra note 79, at 924 (“[Businesses] are risk sensitive to a lost investment
in litigation.”); James Langenfeld & Sophie Yang, FTC v. Actavis: Courts Bring Economics Back to
Reverse Payment Cases, ECON. MAGAZINE at 33, 35 (October 2014) (“[T]he patentee is likely to be risk
averse to an unfavorable [litigation] outcome.”).
87. See Molot, supra note 20, at 69–70 (explaining how a plaintiff is willing to accept a settlement
lower than the expected value of the case when facing a risk neutral, repeat player defendant).
88. Id.
89. Id.; see Kent S. Bernard & Willard K. Tom, Antitrust Treatment of Pharmaceutical Patent
Settlements: The Need for Context and Fidelity to First Principles, 15 FED. CIR. B.J. 617, 630 (2006)
(explaining how a pharmaceutical patentee is risk averse facing litigation and that the risk aversion will
affect settlement demands); J.J. Prescott & Kathryn E. Spier, A Comprehensive Theory of Civil
Settlement, 91 NYU L. REV. 59, 73 (2016) (showing that the plaintiff’s settlement is the expected value
of the case discounted by the plaintiff’s risk premium).
90. See Molot, supra note 20, at 67 (“Substantive law goals, such as deterrence, compensation, and
retributive justice, cannot be achieved if defendants end up paying amounts different from what
substantive law obligates them to pay, or if plaintiffs end up receiving amounts different from what
substantive law entitles them to receive.”); Molot, supra note 83, at 172 (“If a principal goal of our
procedural system is to ensure accurate resolution of disputes—so that defendants pay and plaintiffs
receive precisely what they should when one applies substantive law to the facts of their case—then these
bargaining imbalances represent a serious problem.”).
91. See Molot, supra note 20, at 96–97 (“[The funder] can offer the plaintiff cash for a portion of
the recovery where the plaintiff . . . simply wants to reduce his exposure to litigation risk.”); Schwartz,
supra note 82 (“Larger companies, even those with their own in-house counsel, are selling off pieces of
lawsuits to smooth out cash flow and offload risk.”).
92. See John Beisner et al., Selling Lawsuits, Buying Trouble: Third-Party Litigation Funding in the
United
States,
U.S.
CHAMBER
INST.
FOR
LEGAL
REFORM
6
(Oct.
2009),
http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/thirdpartylitigationfinancing.pdf (“[T]hird-party
funding companies are able to mitigate their downside risk . . . they can spread the risk of any particular
case over their entire portfolio of cases . . . .”); Shepherd & Stone, supra note 79, at 943 (“Like any
investor, litigation financiers first hedge against risk by buying stakes in large pools of litigation,
purchasing portions of many cases rather than a few cases in entirety.”).
93. Molot, supra note 20, at 69–71.
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bear litigation risk may compel a business to sell its patent.94 The company
may prefer upfront capital from a troll rather than uncertain payments from
potential defendants.95 The troll is less risk averse than the company because
the former owns multiple patents and can spread the risk of one over its entire
portfolio.96 Thus, the troll can obtain a settlement closer to the expected value
of the case.97
Finally, funders and trolls are repeat players in the litigation game and
bring beneficial experience to the table.98 Financiers gain expertise on case
valuation after investing in multiple lawsuits.99 In the early stages of
litigation, a funder can provide a helpful perspective on case value and
possibly influence the caliber of the attorney that the plaintiff chooses.100
Trolls also offer repeat-player lawsuit expertise. The primary business of
these entities is vindicating patent rights.101 Unlike some product- or servicebased companies, trolls are familiar with the litigation process and the repeat-

94. See David Yurkerwich, Patent Sales and the IP Business Plan, IAM-MAGAZINE (2008),
http://www.iam-media.com/Intelligence/Licensing-in-the-Boardroom/2008/Articles/Patent-sales-andthe-IP-business-plan (“[In a patent sale,] a full risk transfer takes place in exchange for a fixed payment
that has ‘priced in’ all past and future opportunities and risks to generate royalty income. . . . [I]ndividual
licensors frequently engage in structured sales as they are usually cash constrained and risk averse . . . .”).
95. See id. (“Boards need to evaluate the trade-off between the lower proceeds that can be realised
from an immediate sale versus the time and uncertainty associated with litigation.”).
96. See, e.g., Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2126 (describing patent aggregator trolls);
Myhrvold, supra note 17, at 8 (noting the multitude of patents that Intellectual Ventures, a patent troll,
has).
97. See Prescott & Spier, supra note 89, at 73 (showing that the settlement amount varies from the
expected value of the case due to litigants’ risk premiums).
98. See Marc Galanter, Why the “Haves” Come Out Ahead: Speculations on the Limits of Legal
Change, 9 LAW & SOC’Y REV. 95, 98 (1974) (“[Repeat players in litigation] develop expertise and have
ready access to specialists.”).
99. See Douglas R. Richmond, Other People’s Money: The Ethics of Litigation Funding,
56 MERCER L. REV. 649, 651 (2005) (“The key to success for funding companies is to employ people
with the claim and case evaluation expertise that traditional lenders typically lack or to develop systems
or methodologies that are reasonable substitutes for such expertise.”); Jason Lyon, Comment, Revolution
in Progress: Third-Party Funding of American Litigation, 58 UCLA L. Rev. 571, 593 (2010) (“[T]he
third-party funders’ very existence depends upon an accurate assessment of the value of claims, and the
relative level of risk associated with each. Therefore, it is reasonable to expect that their expertise at claim
valuation will surpass that of most attorneys.”).
100. See, e.g., Molot, supra note 83, at 180 (“Each litigant that Burford financed at the outset is one
that would have found some lawyer to handle its dispute if it had been unable to finance it, although that
lawyer would not have had the experience, ability, or resources possessed by the lawyer ultimately
selected.”).
101. Colleen V. Chien, Of Trolls, Davids, Goliaths, and Kings: Narratives and Evidence in the
Litigation of High-Tech Patents, 87 N.C. L. REV. 1571, 1579 (2009).
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player defendants and judges.102 These non-practicing entities likely have
learned from past mistakes and have crafted winning legal strategies.103
B. Trolls Are Not Worse than Funders
While the FTC has deemed trolls similar enough to funders to be in the
same market,104 skeptics may argue that these two entities are fundamentally
different because the former buy the right to bring the claim, whereas the
latter only contract for a percentage of the lawsuit proceeds. Specifically,
critics may argue that trolls are worse than funders for two reasons: (1) trolls
have more incentives than funders to stir up frivolous litigation, and (2) they
can shortchange patent sellers by buying claims outright. This Section
addresses each contention.
1. Stirring Up Frivolous Litigation
Opponents may argue that trolls are worse than funders because the
former have more incentives to stir up frivolous litigation. However, this is
likely untrue. First, parties who can profit off of lawsuits—whether they own
legal claims or not—will drive litigation.105 Both trolls and funders want to
realize the monetary gains from lawsuit assets.106 The fact that a financier
possesses the right to only part of the proceeds does not mean that it has any
less of an incentive than a troll in seeking profitable cases in which to invest.
The financier is comparable to the attorney of the plaintiffs in class actions
and derivative lawsuits.107 In these types of cases, the attorney has a large
102. See Galanter, supra note 98, at 99 (“[Repeat players in litigation] have opportunities to develop
facilitative informal relations with institutional incumbents.”); Risch, supra note 8, at 486 (stating that in
the author’s sample, companies that sold their patents often “had business models other than patent
licensing” and “were attempting to build product or service-based businesses”); Yurkerwich, supra note
94 (citing different reasons that businesses sell patents including the fact that the patents are not related
to the company’s core product- or service-based business).
103. See Galanter, supra note 98, at 103 (“[Repeat players in litigation] by virtue of experience and
expertise, are more likely to be able to discern which rules are likely to ‘penetrate’ and which are likely
to remain merely symbolic . . . [and] are more likely to be able to invest the matching resources necessary
to secure the penetration of rules favorable to them.”).
104. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 62–65.
105. See Wendel, supra note 28, at 748 (“All litigation is financed; the only question is how, and by
whom.”).
106. See, e.g., Marianna Galstyan, Who Are Patent Trolls and How Do They Work?, INVESTOPEDIA
(July 15, 2015), http://www.investopedia.com/articles/investing/071515/who-are-patent-trolls-how-dothey-work.asp (“Patent trolls . . . are companies that make money on patent infringement lawsuits.”); Roy
Strom,
Numbers
Never
Lie—Or
Do
They?,
CHICAGO LAWYER
(Feb.
2015),
http://www.chicagolawyermagazine.com/Archives/2015/02/Litigation-Funding-Business.aspx
(“For
litigation funders, [complex litigation is] a valuable asset.”).
107. See John C. Coffee, Jr., Understanding the Plaintiff’s Attorney: The Implications of Economic
Theory for Private Enforcement of Law Through Class and Derivative Actions, 86 COLUM. L. REV. 669,
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financial stake in the outcome and is the driving force behind the claims; he
finds meritorious lawsuits and secures the required plaintiffs in order to
initiate the legal actions.108 Similar to such an attorney, a funder views
profitable cases as good investment opportunities and seeks them out.109 In
sum, funders have no less of an incentive than trolls to “stir up” litigation.
Second, trolls and financiers have reasons to make sound business
decisions and not invest in frivolous cases. Trolls must be able to maintain
credible litigation threats against future infringers in order to stay financially
afloat.110 Thus, they buy patents they believe are valid and have a reasonable
chance of eliciting royalties.111 Similarly, funders must invest in a good
portfolio of lawsuits in order to avoid operating losses in the long run.112
They also want to cultivate a reputation for financing valid claims in order
to attract profitable future investment opportunities.113
Finally, regardless of whether the plaintiff is a troll or not, all attorneys
are bound by ethical duties, enforced by potential Rule 11 sanctions, to
advise their clients against meritless lawsuits.114 Further, attorneys that
operate on contingency fees will not want to waste their efforts on low

683 (1986) (“[O]ne better understands the behavior of the plaintiff’s attorney in class and derivative
actions if one views him not as an agent [of the plaintiff], but more as an entrepreneur who regards a
litigation as a risky asset that requires continuing investment decisions.”).
108. See id. at 678 (“Once the plaintiff’s attorney has decided to bring suit, identifying and securing
a nominal client is often only a necessary procedural step that seldom poses a substantial barrier for the
experienced professional.”).
109. See, e.g., FAQS, BURFORD, http://www.burfordcapital.com/faqs/ (last visited Apr. 3, 2016)
(explaining that Burford, a commercial litigation funder, provides financing for a wide variety of
meritorious commercial litigation).
110. See Schwartz & Kesan, supra note 7, at 428 (“[Patent trolls] expect and are entitled to make
money for assuming risks and uncertainty [associated with the purchased patents].”); Shrestha, supra note
6, at 127 (explaining that patent trolls bring “a credible litigation threat”).
111. See supra Section I.A.
112. See John P. Barylick & Jenna W. Hashway, Litigation Financing: Preying on Plaintiffs, 59
R.I.B.J., Mar.–Apr. 2011, at 5, 8 (“[Funders] carefully analyze applicants’ cases and accept only those
they deem to have a high likelihood of recovery.”); Mariel Rodak, Comment, It’s About Time: A Systems
Thinking Analysis of the Litigation Finance Industry and Its Effects on Settlement, 155 U. PA. L. REV.
503, 518–519 (2006) (“[I]t is in a litigation finance company’s best interest to advance only to those
plaintiffs who, in its determination, have a reasonable chance of succeeding, since its investment will
otherwise be for naught.”).
113. See, e.g., Lyon, supra note 99, at 595 (“[T]hird-party funders will likely be averse to the
reputational costs of supporting frivolous litigation.”).
114. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1, 3.1 (2013) (Rule 2.1 explains that lawyers must
advise the client candidly, while Rule 3.1 explains that the lawyer has a duty to not bring frivolous
litigation.); FED. R. CIV. P. 11 (allowing sanctions for frivolous litigation); see also Wesley A. Cann, Jr.,
Frivolous Lawsuits—The Lawyer’s Duty to Say “No,” 52 U. COLO. L. REV. 367, 372 (1981) (describing
the lawyer’s ethical duty to not bring frivolous claims”); Lyon, supra note 99, at 594–95 (“Attorneys have
a duty to warn clients when their claims are without merit. . . . Any gains [the attorney] might make in
fees could be offset by fines for prosecuting a frivolous suit.”).
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probability cases.115 Until the 1990s, patent litigation was primarily handled
on an hourly fee basis.116 However, in recent years, large wins by patent
lawyers on contingency fees and an increase in demand for alternative fee
structures that resulted from the Great Recession have spurred on
contingency fee representation in patent cases.117
2. Shortchanging Patent Sellers
Opponents may also argue that trolls are worse than funders because
the former can shortchange patent sellers by buying legal claims outright.
However, this is also likely untrue. First, in the last few years, the number of
trolls has increased.118 These entities are likely to compete against each other
for valuable patents, bidding the price of the legal claims up, not down.119
Second, the seller likely knows more about the patent than the buyer because
it filed the application and is familiar with the prior art, scope, and technical
field.120 Thus, the seller should have a better idea of the patent value than the
buyer and is not likely to accept an unfair price.121
Further, the seller’s information advantage can lead to an adverse
selection problem in a market for legal claims.122 When buyers cannot see
the true quality of legal claims, they believe that those sold are generally of

115. See Hosie, supra note 33, at 80 (“The cost of building and trying a patent case can easily exceed
$4 million. No sane plaintiff’s lawyer would spend this kind of money on a frivolous case.”); Lyon, supra
note 99, at 593 (“[T]he attorney’s interest in recovery would prevent her from accepting frivolous claims
on a contingency basis.”); Shrestha, supra note 6, at 120 (“[I]t is doubtful whether . . . a contingency fee
attorney[] would sue a defendant if there was a low probability of a positive outcome.”).
116. David L. Schwartz, The Rise of Contingent Fee Representation in Patent Litigation, 64 ALA. L.
REV. 335, 354 (2012).
117. Id. at 355.
118. See Cotropia et al., supra note 7, at 676 fig.2 (2014) (the number of large aggregators and patent
holding companies together increased by 44 from 2010 to 2012).
119. The smartphone patent war is an example of how bidding among patent buyers has worked;
Rockstar, a company that ended up with some of the patents, operates under the patent troll model. See
Joe Mullin, Patent War Goes Nuclear: Microsoft, Apple-Owned “Rockstar” sues Google, ARS TECHNICA
(Oct. 31, 2013), http://arstechnica.com/tech-policy/2013/10/patent-war-goes-nuclear-microsoft-appleowned-rockstar-sues-google/.
120. See Michael Abramowicz, On the Alienability of Legal Claims, 114 YALE L.J. 697, 743 (2005)
(“Just as potential sellers of used cars have better information about the quality of their vehicles than can
be assessed easily by other parties, so too do the original parties to a dispute have unique access to
information about their claims.”); Elisa Ughetto & Cristina Odasso, Patent Value: Seller and Bidder
Perspectives 7–8 (Druid Summer Conference, Working Paper, 2010) (stating that the patent seller has to
provide information on “ownership status, validity, licensing activity, infringement, potential value [of
patents] and so on” in a patent auction).
121. Ughetto & Odasso, supra note 120, at 7–8.
122. See Abramowicz, supra note 120, at 743 (explaining how asymmetric information between a
buyer and seller of a legal claim can lead to an adverse selection problem).
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lower quality.123 This leads to heavy discounting of claims, which then leads
to sellers pulling them out of the market.124 Adverse selection can reduce the
number of claims sold or can cause the market to completely fail.125 In his
article, Abramowicz used a simulation to show that the adverse selection
problem may be overcome in circumstances where the buyer’s litigation
costs are substantially lower than those of the original plaintiff (i.e., the
seller) and the potential defendant.126 The reason that the patent market and
its associated capital-injection and risk-shifting benefits are able to survive
is because trolls can engage in lawsuits at a lower cost than others. Trolls’
opportunity costs of litigation are lower than those of practicing-entity sellers
because their primary business is bringing lawsuits, not distributing products
or services.127 Additionally, trolls, as plaintiffs, have lower discovery costs
than defendants because plaintiffs only need to produce the patent document
and prosecution history in response to discovery requests.128
C. Conclusion
In sum, Part II demonstrated that trolls provide litigation-related
benefits and that these benefits are legitimate since they are the same ones
provided by commercial litigation funders, which operate in the same market
as trolls. Section II.A showed that like funders, trolls make available capital
for lawsuits, help mitigate risk differences, and offer repeat-player expertise.
The only difference between trolls and funders is that the former buy the
patents outright and the latter buy interests in the proceeds of patent cases.
Section II.B rebutted allegations that the difference in claim ownership
makes trolls fundamentally worse than funders. Both are incentivized as
businesses to not invest in frivolous claims, and financiers do not have any
less incentive than trolls to stir up litigation.129 Further, patent sellers’
123. See id.
124. See id.
125. See id.
126. See id. at 745 (“Perhaps in [circumstances in which third-party buyers have substantial
advantages in litigation costs,] the adverse selection problem can be overcome.”).
127. See Chien, supra note 101, at 1579 (“[P]atent enforcement is [patent trolls’] core business.”);
Shepherd & Stone, supra note 79, at 927 (“Most companies with sufficient business ventures to engender
valuable business litigation have lucrative substitutes for the capital required to prosecute a complex
commercial case, including developing new product lines, recruiting scarce or expensive talent, or
expanding current manufacturing or distribution channels.”).
128. See John M. Golden, Patent Trolls and Patent Remedies, 85 TEX. L. REV. 2111, 2133 (2007)
(The patent holders’ “litigation costs might not be expected to be as great as those expected for the
potential infringer.”); Shepherd, supra note 21, at 602 (“[P]laintiffs often have few documents beyond
the patent and prosecution history.”).
129. See supra Section II.B.1.
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information advantage makes it unlikely for trolls to shortchange sellers, and
this advantage is the very reason that the troll business model must operate
the way it does in order to provide the litigation-related benefits.130
III. DO NOT TARGET THE TROLLS
Believing that trolls are responsible for patent litigation’s ills, some
policymakers have considered and even passed laws that disadvantage these
entities in an effort to eliminate them and, in turn, cure the ills. In 2013, a
federal bill called the Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal
Disputes (“SHIELD”) Act was introduced.131 It required a court to award full
litigation costs to the defendant if it won and the opposing party was not an
original inventor, practicing entity, or university (i.e., if the plaintiff was a
patent troll).132 Though this bill never made it out of committee,133 it serves
as a clear example of how policies may be crafted to target trolls.
Additionally, out of the twenty states that have passed laws to sanction vague
demand letters, seventeen of them exempt certain entities such as universities
and technology transfer organizations, which sell or license patents to
companies that have not yet chosen patented technologies.134 Since trolls are
neither universities nor ex ante patent dealers, they do not qualify for these
exemptions.135
As explained in Part I, trolls should not be blamed for patent litigation
ills because they are not the sole contributor to the ills or are not responsible
for them in the first place. Disadvantaging trolls in an effort to eradicate
them—as seen in the SHIELD bill and the vague demand letter state laws—
will not only fail to cure the problems but will also eliminate a source of the
litigation-related benefits highlighted in Part II.

130.
131.
132.
133.

See supra Section II.B.2.
H.R. 845, 113th Cong. (2014).
Id.
See H.R. 845 – Saving High-Tech Innovators from Egregious Legal Disputes Act of 2013,
CONGRESS.GOV (Apr. 8, 2013), https://www.congress.gov/bill/113th-congress/house-bill/845 (showing
that the last action taken on this bill was referral to the Subcommittee on Courts, Intellectual Property,
and the Internet).
134. See BALUCH, supra note 2, at 42–49 (surveying state law activity regarding vague demand
letters up to January 2015); see also Jonathan Griffin, 2015 Patent Trolling Legislation, NAT’L CONF.
STATE LEG. (Nov. 12, 2015), http://www.ncsl.org/research/financial-services-and-commerce/2015patent-trolling-legislation.aspx (listing state legislature activity concerning patent litigation reform
related to regulating demand letters).
135. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 50–51, 69 (explaining that patent trolls are not part
of the ex ante technology transfer market).
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Targeting trolls in reforms will also lead to two adverse consequences.
Section III.A discusses how eliminating these non-practicing entities will
increase trolling behavior by practicing entities. This is undesirable because
unlike trolls who generally do not discriminate against potential infringers,
practicing entities seek to destroy their competitors and have a higher
likelihood of reducing market producers than non-practicing entities, due to
a greater ability to obtain injunctive relief.136 Section III.B explains that upon
the passage of policies that disadvantage trolls, investors will shift capital
from these entities to funders. This consequence is also undesirable because
unlike the troll business model, litigation financing implicates issues dealing
with decision-maker conflicts of interest, waivers of attorney-client privilege
and work-product doctrine protection, and the improper influence of funding
on the attorney.137
A. An Increase in Trolling Behavior by Practicing Entities
Eliminating trolls will likely result in an increase in trolling behavior by
practicing entities.138 In this Section, “trolling behavior” is defined as
accumulating patents and asserting them against practicing entities—
precisely the type of conduct that critics complain about.139 The growing
phenomena of defensive patenting and patent privateering suggest that trolls
are currently not alone in engaging in trolling behavior and that the frequency
of practicing entities asserting their patent portfolios will further increase
once trolls are out of the picture.
First, practicing entities have started building portfolios of self-created
and purchased patents in order to defend themselves in litigation by
counterclaiming
against
practicing-entity
plaintiffs
(“defensive
140
patenting”). Defensive patenting occurs in the semiconductor, computer,
electronics, and financial industries.141 As practicing entities grow their
businesses, many start to assert patents against others, regardless of whether

136. See infra Section III.A.
137. See infra Section III.B.
138. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2152 (“There is little reason to believe that, as long as
there is an abundance of patents that can be used to generate revenues, buy patent peace, or tax
competitors, only trolls will try to profit from them.”).
139. See supra Section I.C (discussing the impenetrable patent portfolio problem).
140. See Chien, supra note 101, at 1582 (“By building portfolios of patents, companies can
discourage or neutralize threats of suits brought by their competitors.”); Lemley & Melamed, supra note
6, at 2154–55 (discussing patent aggregation by trolls and non-trolls).
141. Chien, supra note 101, at 1582–83.
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others sue them first.142 Examples of companies that have followed this path
include Microsoft, Yahoo, Alcatel, Tessera, and Sun Microsystems.143 If
trolls go out of business as a result of adverse laws, practicing entities that
do not wish to engage in patent enforcement will not be able to sell their
patents to these non-practicing entities. They will have one less alternative
to profit off of their inventions, making patent assertion more attractive.144
Second, practicing entities have engaged in patent privateering, which
occurs when a company sells its patents to a troll and then allies with that
troll to assert them against the company’s competitors.145 Examples of these
alliances include: Nokia with MOSAID, Micron with Round Rock Ventures,
Ericsson with Unwired Planet, and British Telecom with IPValue.146 If laws
disincentivize trolls, practicing entities will no longer have a choice to
partner with (and hide behind) trolls to destroy their competitors. Instead,
they will likely take up the patent assertion activities that were previously
delegated to trolls.
The shift of trolling behavior to practicing entities is undesirable
because these entities target their competitors in patent infringement
lawsuits. With the exception of those that are part of privateering
agreements, trolls usually assert their patents against all potential infringers,
without discrimination, in order to maximize profits.147 In fact, they have an
incentive to see companies stay in business so that they can continue to
obtain royalties for infringing technologies.148 In contrast, practicing entities
go after their competitors so that they can dominate the market for their
products and services.149 They have an incentive to increase their rivals’
costs and prices through high licensing fees and thereby increase consumer
142. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2135; see Chien, supra note 101, at 1583 (“Despite the
importance of defensive patenting strategies among high-tech companies, the share of suits involving
hardware and software inventions has actually risen, not declined.”).
143. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2136; see Chien, supra note 101, at 1582 (referencing Sun
Microsystems when explaining defensive licensing).
144. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 68 (“Both large and small companies are better able
[with patent trolls] to find buyers for patent portfolios that they no longer need or wish to maintain. Selling
those portfolios allows companies to recoup some return on the associated R&D investment and raise
funds that can be used to support other innovative efforts.”).
145. Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2137.
146. Id. at 2137–38.
147. See id. at 2145 (“A revenue-maximizing patent holder, whether a practicing entity or a troll, will
not seek royalties above the level that will maximize its revenues.”).
148. See id. at 2146 (“Trolls have no similar incentive; they get paid more if the defendant stays in
business and uses their patented technologies.”).
149. See, e.g., id. at 2145 (Practicing entities’ objective is “to impose royalty costs on competitors
that will reduce demand for the competitors’ products and thereby increase demand for their own
products.”).
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demand for their own goods.150 Large companies often see patent litigation
as a way to exhaust the resources of their small competitors.151 Established
businesses strategically use patent lawsuits to drive out new entrants.152
These companies can do this by obtaining injunctive relief in infringement
actions and refusing to license their patents to their competitors.153
Further, under the eBay four-factor test for a permanent injunction, it is
more difficult for trolls than practicing entities to obtain injunctive relief,
making the latter a greater threat in terms of reducing the number of players
in the market for products and services.154 Under eBay, a plaintiff must show
“(1) that it has suffered an irreparable injury; (2) that remedies available at
law, such as monetary damages, are inadequate to compensate for that injury;
(3) that, considering the balance of hardships between the plaintiff and
defendant, a remedy in equity is warranted; and (4) that the public interest
would not be disserved by a permanent injunction.”155 Courts have
frequently found that plaintiffs fail to demonstrate irreparable injury and
inadequacy of damages (i.e., elements one and two) when they do not
practice the invention at issue and are willing to license their patent to other
infringers.156 Thus, trolls have a lower likelihood of obtaining injunctive

150. Id.
151. Id. at 2146; see Chien, supra note 101, at 1589–90, 1610 (finding that forty-one percent of hightech litigation involves a large defendant and small plaintiff).
152. See Chien, supra note 101, at 1588 (“By suing less-established firms, critics say, predatory
plaintiffs can use litigation to threaten their survival.”); Golden, supra note 128, at 2154 (“[P]atents that
industry incumbents cross license in the spirit of détente may simultaneously be used to create barriers to
new entrants.”); Magliocca, supra note 58, at 1818 (“Advocates for small inventors in garages argue that
corporations see start-ups as easy fodder for a ‘scorched-earth’ strategy of stealing their patents and
fighting an infringement suit in the hope of exhausting a plaintiff’s funds.”).
153. See eBay, Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (explaining the elements
required for a patentee to obtain a permanent injunction).
154. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 27 (“Conventional wisdom assumes patentees that
do not compete in a product market cannot obtain injunctions because money damages will adequately
compensate any harm they may suffer from infringement. Conventional wisdom also assumes that a
patent owner practicing the patent can and should be granted an injunction.”); Robert J. Garrey & John
M. Jackson, The Permanent Injunction Threat in Patent Cases: Has Ebay v. MercExchange Changed the
Landscape for Patent Litigation in Texas District Courts? 11 (Sept. 22, 2006),
http://images.jw.com/com/publications/626.pdf (“Based on the cases discussed above, it appears that
plaintiffs that use their patents to produce goods and services are far more likely to obtain injunctive relief
against competitors adjudged to infringe their patents than are plaintiffs who merely license their
patents.”); Benjamin H. Diessel, Note, Trolling for Trolls: The Pitfalls of the Emerging Market
Competition Requirement for Permanent Injunctions in Patent Cases Post-eBay, 106 MICH. L. REV. 305,
309–10 (2007) (Post-eBay, “district courts have continued to make commercializing and competing in
the market with a patented invention a necessary precondition to gaining an injunction.”).
155. eBay, 547 U.S. at 391.
156. See Diessel, supra note 154, at 324 (“In cases where courts denied injunctions and plaintiffs
were willing licensors and did not commercialize their inventions, courts found neither irreparable injury
nor inadequate remedy at law.”).
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relief than practicing-entity plaintiffs and cannot use injunctions to force
companies out of product- or service-based markets.157
In sum, if laws disadvantage trolls and make their business model less
profitable, trolling behavior by practicing entities will increase. This is
undesirable because practicing entities often seek to eliminate their
competitors using patent litigation and have a greater likelihood than trolls
of forcing out market producers under the current eBay test for granting
permanent injunctions.158 These entities’ legal actions will likely increase
rivals’ costs, reduce the number of market players, and, in turn, raise prices
for consumers.159 Unfortunately, antitrust laws are unlikely to mitigate this
concern. The goal of the patent system is to promote innovation through a
twenty-year statutory monopoly.160 Patentees have no duty to license their
patented inventions during the monopoly period and can unilaterally and
unconditionally refuse to deal with a competitor.161 Antitrust laws only guard
against two actions: (1) an extension of a patentee’s statutory monopoly into
another market of an unpatented product or service162 and (2) an interference
with a competitor’s business when the plaintiff knows that the patent is
invalid or not infringed.163

157. See id. at 310–22 (“Part I concludes that district judges have created and employed a ‘market
competition requirement,’ or phrased more colloquially, district judges are essentially ‘trolling for
trolls.’ ”).
158. See Lemley & Melamed, supra note 6, at 2145 (discussing how practicing entities have
incentives to go after their competitors).
159. See id.
160. See FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 1 (“The goal of the patent system is to promote
innovation in the face of that expense and risk. It does so by giving patent owners the right to exclude
others from making, using or selling a patented invention for 20 years.”).
161. See Continental Paper Bag Co. v. Eastern Paper Bag Co., 210 U.S. 405, 429 (1908)
(“[E]xclusion may be said to have been of the very essence of the right conferred by the patent, as it is
the privilege of any owner of property to use or not use it . . . .”); In re Indep. Serv. Orgs. Antitrust Litig.
CSU, L.L.C., 203 F.3d 1322, 1329 (Fed. Cir. 2000) (standing for the proposition that patentees can
unilaterally and unconditionally refuse to deal with other entities); United States v. Westinghouse Elec.
Corp., 648 F.2d 642, 647 (1981) (“Westinghouse has done no more than to license some of its patents
and refuse to license others. ‘[T]he right to invoke the State’s power to prevent others from utilizing his
discovery without his consent’ is the essence of the patentee’s statutory monopoly.” (citations omitted)).
162. See Morton Salt Co. v. G.S. Suppiger Co., 314 U.S. 488, 491 (1942) (standing for the
proposition that a court will not protect the patent monopoly when the patentee is using the patent to try
to restrain competition in the sale of a unpatented item).
163. See Walker Process Equip., Inc. v. Food Mach. & Chem. Corp., 382 U.S. 172, 174 (1965)
(“[E]nforcement of a patent procured by fraud on the Patent Office may be violative of § 2 of the Sherman
Act . . . .”); Handgards, Inc. v. Ethicon, Inc., 601 F.2d 986, 994 (9th Cir. 1979) (allowing for a claim that
enforcement of a patent that was asserted with knowledge of invalidity or non-infringement violates
antitrust laws).
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B. An Increase in Litigation Funding
Targeting trolls in patent litigation reform will likely divert capital to
litigation financiers. Hedge funds, private equity firms, and other investors
are always looking for different opportunities to make money.164 When the
Great Recession hit, they flocked to litigation funding because lawsuit
returns are not correlated with economic fluctuations.165 If laws make the
troll business model less profitable, investors will funnel their capital into
litigation finance. This is likely because funders and trolls both operate in
the ex post patent transaction and litigation market and provide comparable
services.166 Both businesses are investing in patent lawsuits—either taking
full or partial interest in the proceeds.167
This diversion of capital is undesirable because three issues arise with
funding that do not with the troll business structure: (1) conflicts of interest
with judges and arbitrators, (2) waivers of attorney-client privilege and
work-product doctrine protection, and (3) funding’s undue influence on the
attorney at the expense of the plaintiff. First, funding may give rise to
conflicts of interest with judges and arbitrators because a case decisionmaker may have a financial investment or tie with a financier.168 Currently,
parties do not have to disclose funding agreements to judges or arbitrators.169
Thus, decision-maker conflicts of interest that involve lawsuit financing are
not likely to be discovered, and proper recusal cannot occur.
Second, there is uncertainty as to whether the attorney-client privilege
and/or work-product doctrine protection will be waived when lawsuit
information is disclosed to a funder.170 The plaintiff must disclose case
details to the financier so that it can evaluate the expected profitability of the
164. See, e.g., Rob Copeland, Hedge-Fund Manager’s Next Frontier: Lawsuits, WALL ST. J. (Mar.
9,
2015),
http://www.wsj.com/articles/hedge-fund-managers-next-frontier-lawsuits-1425940706
(explaining that a hedge-fund’s next investment will be class-action lawsuits).
165. Maya Steinitz, Whose Claim Is This Anyway? Third Party Litigation Funding, 95 MINN. L. REV.
1268, 1283–84 (2011).
166. FED. TRADE COMM’N, supra note 67, at 62–65.
167. See, e.g., GARBER, supra note 20, at 13 (“[Commercial litigation funders] typically provide
capital in exchange for a share of the eventual recovery by a corporate plaintiff.”); Schwartz & Kesan,
supra note 7, at 428 (“[Patent trolls] purchase patents from these patentees who cannot afford to enforce
their own patents.”).
168. See Victoria A. Shannon, Harmonizing Third-Party Litigation Funding Regulation, 36
CARDOZO L. REV. 861, 903 (2015) (“[M]any funders are banks, hedge funds or other financial institutions
in which a judge or arbitrator may have funds invested or may own shares.”).
169. See id. (“[T]here is no general rule that the parties or their legal counsel must disclose identities
of funders.”).
170. See LISA BENCH NIEUWVELD & VICTORIA SHANNON, THIRD-PARTY FUNDING IN
INTERNATIONAL ARBITRATION 141–42 (2012) (discussing the attorney-client privilege and work-product
doctrine in relation to disclosing information to a funder).
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lawsuit and determine whether or not to provide funding. 171 Further, once a
financier decides to provide capital to the plaintiff, it will likely require
updates as the litigation progresses in order to monitor its investment.172 The
attorney-client privilege protects confidential communications between a
lawyer and his client from being disclosed to the opposing party.173 The
purpose of the privilege is to encourage the client to converse honestly with
his attorney; this allows the lawyer to give appropriate legal advice.174
Voluntary revelation of confidential information in these communications to
a third-party typically waives the privilege unless the disclosure falls under
an exception.175
There is currently no general rule that allows for the preservation of the
privilege for information given to the funder.176 Only three courts have
addressed this issue. In Leader Technologies, Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., in
response to a motion to compel information that had been shared with
potential financiers, the plaintiff argued that the attorney-client privilege was
not waived because the common interest exception applied.177 Under this
exception, disclosures to an entity with a shared interest in the dispute do not
waive the privilege.178 The court held that the exception did not apply; the
conclusion rested on the finding that no funding contract was finalized
between the plaintiff and potential financiers.179 Further, the court noted that
the common interest must be “identical” and “legal” (i.e., “not solely
commercial”).180 Similarly, in Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, though a
funding contract was consummated, the court refused to apply the common
interest exception to communications between the plaintiff and financier, as
171. Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Attorney-Client Privilege, 92 DENVER
UNIV. L. REV. 95, 102 (2014).
172. Id. at 102–03.
173. NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 170, at 141; Giesel, supra note 171, at 104.
174. Miller UK Ltd. v. Caterpillar, 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 731 (N.D. Ill. 2014); Giesel, supra note 171,
at 105.
175. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 731; NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 170, at 141.
176. See NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 170, at 142 (“[T]here is no consensus among the states
or under federal law as to whether a third-party funder has a sufficiently common interest to be covered
by this exception.”); Shannon, supra note 168, at 900–01 (describing the variation in how jurisdictions
treat funding disclosures in evaluating whether privilege has been waived); Maya Steinitz et al., Are
Litigation Finance Contracts Protected by Attorney-Client Privilege in New York?, AMERICAN BAR
ASS’N
(Apr.
24–26,
2013),
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/administrative/litigation/materials/sac2013/sac_2013/15
panacea_plague.authcheckdam.pdf (concluding that litigation finance contracts are likely not protected
by attorney-client privilege in New York but may be protected under work-product doctrine).
177. 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375–76 (D. Del. 2010).
178. Id. at 376; NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 170, at 142.
179. Leader Techs., 719 F. Supp. 2d at 375–76.
180. Id. at 376.
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well as other potential funders, because a mutual desire in seeing the
“successful outcome of a case” did not satisfy the element of having a
common “legal” interest.181 In contrast, in Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM Corp., the
court issued a protective order of confidential information shared with a
funder and stated in a footnote that the financier’s and plaintiff’s desire to
see the plaintiff win constituted a common interest.182
The work-product doctrine, which shields the attorney’s written
materials created for the case, may also be waived when information is
disclosed to a funder.183 The purpose of the doctrine is to protect an
attorney’s “mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories . . .
concerning the litigation” and to prevent adversaries from freeriding on their
opponent’s work.184 The tangible materials must have been prepared for or
obtained “because of” current or future litigation.185 Work-product doctrine
protection can only be waived when disclosure of materials to a third party
occurs in a manner that “substantially increases the opportunities for
potential adversaries to obtain the information.”186
Just as the law surrounding funding and the attorney-client privilege is
unsettled, there is currently no general rule concerning litigation finance and
the work-product doctrine.187 With the exception of the Leader Technologies
court, the handful of courts that have faced this issue have concluded that the
work-product doctrine applies to materials containing a lawyer’s case
assessment and strategies that were prepared by the funder or by the
plaintiff’s attorney for the funder.188 In Leader Technologies, the court did
not engage in a separate work-product doctrine analysis but instead
determined that the documents were not protected by either the attorneyclient privilege or work-product doctrine due to the lack of a common
interest between the financier and plaintiff.189 Under the “because of” test,
Miller and Carlyle Investment Management L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A.

181. 17 F. Supp. 3d 711, 730–32 (N.D. Ill. 2014).
182. No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012).
183. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3).
184. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(3)(B); Carlyle Inv. Mgmt. L.L.C. v. Moonmouth Co. S.A., C.A. No. 7841VCP, 2015 WL 778846, at *9 (Del. Ch. Feb. 24, 2015).
185. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 735.
186. Morley v. Square, Inc., No. 4:14CV172, 2015 WL 7273318, at *2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2015).
187. See Grace M. Giesel, Alternative Litigation Finance and the Work-Product Doctrine, 47 WAKE
FOREST L. REV. 1083, 1085 (2012) (“A body of law has not yet developed dealing with the application
of the attorney-client privilege or work-product doctrine to the involvement of [alternative litigation
finance] entities.”).
188. See, e.g., Carlyle, 2015 WL 778846, at *9.
189. Leader Techs., Inc. v. Facebook, Inc., 719 F. Supp. 2d 373, 375–76 (D. Del. 2010).
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found that the fact the funding documents served not only a litigation
function but also a business purpose did not disqualify them from workproduct doctrine protection.190 However, the Carlyle court did note that a
minority of jurisdictions applies the “primary purpose” test under which a
funding document may not have work-product doctrine protection if it is
created for a business purpose.191
With regard to the waiver inquiry, Doe v. Society of Missionaries of
Sacred Heart and Mondis Technologies, Ltd. v. LG Electronics, Inc., held
that written nondisclosure agreements preserved work-product doctrine
protection.192 Miller and Morley v. Square, Inc., concluded that even without
these agreements, revelations to financiers did not substantially increase the
likelihood of defendants learning of the information and thus did not
constitute waiver.193 These courts noted that it would not be in the financiers’
business interests to notify potential clients’ opponents about funding
inquiries and release lawsuit information.194 In sum, there is uncertainty as
to whether the attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine cover
funding-related information and documents. Current case law suggests that
courts will find that attorney-client privilege is waived but work-product
doctrine still applies.195
Finally, along with litigation finance comes the risk that funding unduly
influences the attorney in some way. A lawyer has a duty to give his honest,
independent opinion to his funded client (i.e., the plaintiff).196 Funding may
create situations in which the attorney is tempted to act in a manner that is
190. Carlyle, 2015 WL 778846, at *9; Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 734–35.
191. Carlyle, 2015 WL 778846, at *8–*9; see also Michele DeStefano, Claim Funders and
Commercial Claim Holders: A Common Interest or a Common Problem?, 63 DEPAUL L. REV. 305, 355–
58 (2014) (arguing that the primary purpose test gives courts a lot of discretion to deny work-product
doctrine protection to funding documents); Giesel, supra note 187, at 1103 (“Some courts use the ordinary
business concept as a disqualifier of work-product protection. . . . [E]ven if materials were created in part
in the anticipation of litigation, those materials are not protected if they, in addition, were created in the
ordinary course of business.”).
192. Doe v. Society of the Missionaries of the Sacred Heart, No. 11-CV-02518, 2014 WL 1715376,
at *4 (N.D. Ill. May 1, 2014); Mondis Tech., Ltd. v. LG Elecs., Inc., No. 2:07-CV-565-TJW-CE, 2:08CV-478-TJW, 2011 WL 1714304, at *2–3 (E.D. Tex. May 4, 2011); see also Devon IT, Inc. v. IBM
Corp., No. 10-2899, 2012 WL 4748160, at *1 n.1 (E.D. Pa. Sept. 27, 2012) (noting that work-product
doctrine protection applies in a case that involved nondisclosure agreements between the financier and
plaintiff); Parloff, supra note 29 (“Litigation financiers ordinarily keep the identities of the cases they’re
involved in strictly confidential. Nondisclosure agreements bar revealing any aspect of the negotiations
process (including their existence), while confidentiality clauses protect any agreement reached.”).
193. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 738; Morley v. Square, Inc., No. 4:14CV172, 2015 WL 7273318, at
*2 (E.D. Mo. Nov. 18, 2015).
194. Miller, 17 F. Supp. 3d at 738; Morley, 2015 WL 7273318, at *2.
195. See supra notes 176–194 and accompanying text.
196. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 2.1 (2013).
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inconsistent with the plaintiff’s best interests, particularly during the
negotiation of the financing agreement or at the key junctures of the case like
settlement. First, lawsuit financing may lead to conflict if the funder is a
current or former client of the attorney.197 The lawyer would have to evaluate
his relationship with the client (i.e., the potential recipient of funding) and
financier under conflict of interest rules and determine whether it is ethical
for him to serve as both entities’ attorney.198
Second, funding may also affect the attorney’s financial interests if the
funding agreement affects his proceeds from the case or if the attorney has
an investment in the funder.199 For example, if a lawyer is responsible for
negotiating the plaintiff’s financing contract, he may be tempted to fashion
the agreement in a way that serves his, not the client’s, best interests.200 This
situation may implicate Model Rule of Professional Conduct (“MRPC”) 1.7,
which requires informed consent if there is a “significant risk” that the
representation of the funded client will be “materially limited” by the
attorney’s own interests.201
Third, attorneys may have referral relationships with financiers.202
Express referral agreements in which attorneys receive money in exchange
for referrals likely violate MRPC 1.7(a)(2) and are prohibited by some state
bar ethics committees.203 However, lawyers are generally allowed to inform
197. Id. at 16 (“If the lawyer also has a professional relationship with the [alternative litigation
finance] supplier, then a conventional concurrent conflict of interest arises . . . .”).
198. See MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7–1.11 (2013) (presenting rules for dealing with
client, former client, and prospective client conflicts of interest).
199. See Shannon, supra note 168, at 905–06 (describing how attorneys may not be in the best
position to negotiate the litigation funding contract due to their financial interests); see also AMERICAN
BAR ASS’N COMM’N, supra note 19, at 17 (describing how a conflict of interest can arise during the
negotiation of the funding contract if the “terms of the agreement may have an impact on the lawyer’s
own interests”); NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note 170, at 136 (discussing the American Bar
Association’s model rules that may be relevant concerning conflicts of interest that may arise due to the
attorney’s financial interest in the funder).
200. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N, supra note 19, at 17 (“[M]aterial limitation conflict could arise
from the lawyer’s involvement in negotiating a contract with an [alternative litigation finance] supplier.”).
201. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7 (2013); see also AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N,
supra note 19, at 17 (explaining that “the client is entitled to know about the risks presented by the
lawyer’s financial and other incentives created by the contract” since it may create conflict under MRPC
1.7).
202. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N, supra note 19, at 24–26 (discussing attorney referral of
clients to funders).
203. MODEL RULES OF PROF’L CONDUCT R. 1.7(a)(2) (2013); see, e.g., N.J. Supreme Court Advisory
Comm.
on
Prof’l
Ethics,
Advisory
Op.
691
(2001),
http://njlaw.rutgers.edu/collections/ethics/acpe/acp691_1.html (“The attorney will not otherwise profit or
benefit from [funding, with respect to referrals]”); Ohio Supreme Court Bd. of Comm’rs on Grievances
and
Discipline,
Advisory
Op.
2002-2
(2002),
http://www.supremecourt.ohio.gov/Boards/BOC/Advisory_Opinions/2002/default.asp (“It is improper
under . . . the Ohio Code of Professional Responsibility for a lawyer to provide loan applications and
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clients of litigation finance and refer them to funders.204 Though informal
attorney referral to a financier is permitted, this practice still may be a cause
for concern due to the repeat nature of lawyers and funders in the litigation
market.205 The lawyer may fear that if he does not obey the financier’s wishes
(e.g., in giving settlement advice), then the funder will not invest in other
cases that the attorney works on. This may be particularly worrisome in the
initial stages of the lawsuit financing market when there is a small number
of funders that operate in certain geographic areas or that are interested in
specific case types.
All of the problems that arise with litigation finance are averted in the
troll business structure. The primary difference between funders and trolls—
owning the legal rights and possessing a portion of lawsuit proceeds—
obviates the problems that implicate lawsuit financing. After a troll buys a
patent, it acts as both plaintiff and financier, preserving the privileges
traditionally associated with the attorney-client relationship and evading
conflicts of interest and litigation control issues involving the funder. In a
way, the troll is the most evolved form of lawsuit financier, and its business
model is a demonstration of how a robust litigation market could work. The
only circumstance in which the aforementioned problems with funding are
not resolved is when the troll enters into a financing contract. However, this
situation is no worse than when the financier enters into a relationship with
a practicing-entity plaintiff. Further, trolls are less likely to go to funders than
other plaintiffs because investors funnel money to these non-practicing
entities for the purpose of patent assertion.206
In sum, disadvantaging trolls in patent litigation reform will likely
deflect investment capital to lawsuit funders. This is undesirable because
funding implicates a whole host of issues that the troll business model avoids
make referrals of clients to lenders recommended to the law firm by a consulting company that receives
commissions or referral fees from the lender for each loan completed and also receives an annual
consulting fee from the law firm, unless there is full disclosure and informed consent.”).
Some states have also explicitly banned referral payments between consumer litigation funders
and attorneys. See OKLA. STAT. tit. 14A, § 3-814 (2016); TENN. CODE ANN. § 47-51-105 (2016); NEB.
REV. STAT. §§ 25-3304 (2016).
204. AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N, supra note 19, at 24.
205. See AMERICAN BAR ASS’N COMM’N, supra note 19, at 24–25 (discussing how referring clients
to funders may raise a risk of interference with the attorney’s independent professional judgment);
Shannon, supra note 168, at 905 (“[I]f the lawyer and the funder have an arrangement whereby they often
refer business to each other, then the interests of the two of them may trump the interest of the underlying
client as they are negotiating the funding arrangement.”); see also NIEUWVELD & SHANNON, supra note
170, at 136 (discussing the American Bar Association’s model rules that may be relevant concerning
conflicts of interest that may arise due to the attorney’s relationship with the funder).
206. See Chien, supra note 101, at 1579 (“[P]atent enforcement is [patent trolls’] core business.”);
McCurdy, supra note 10, at 82 (Patent trolls receive funding from “pension funds, hedge funds,
endowments, and other sources of alternative investments, including even other businesses.”).
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including potential conflicts of interest with judges or arbitrators, waivers of
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protection, and
situations in which funding may negatively influence the attorney to act in a
way that is inconsistent with the client’s best interests.
CONCLUSION
Patent litigation is riddled with problems including weak and vague
legal claims, high costs, impenetrable patent portfolios, and inconvenient
timing of lawsuits. Some have targeted trolls as the cause of these problems,
but this paper has shown that these entities are not responsible for these
issues or that these problems are not unique to them. Moreover, trolls offer
three litigation-related benefits: capital provision, risk-bearing, and repeatplayer experience. These benefits are the same ones for which commercial
litigation funders are praised. Eliminating trolls will not only close off a
source of these benefits but also worsen problems by shifting trolling
behavior to practicing entities and increasing investment in funders. Patent
assertions by practicing entities are worse than those of trolls because the
former seek to destroy their competitors and have a higher likelihood of
doing so than the latter due to the current law for granting injunctive relief.
Additionally, trolls are better than funders because the troll business model
avoids issues related to decision-maker conflicts of interest, waivers of
attorney-client privilege and work-product doctrine protection, and the
improper influence of funding on the attorney. In conclusion, though patent
litigation is plagued with problems, targeting troll plaintiffs is not the answer
to solving them.

